Rewriting-history attacks can erase all valid records of blockchain-based systems, which is extremely devastating. To deter such attacks, we design a new smart contract-based secure model to make such attacks ineffective. Each node who creates a new block is required to register with the smart contract to get a voucher required for the subsequent block validation. We introduce the design idea and the structure of the proposed model in detail. We also present the algorithms of the smart contract and analyze the security performance of the proposed model in different cases. To prove the feasibility of the proposed model, we use the Solidity language to implement the smart contract in this model and simulate it on the Ethereum test network. We also show simulation results in terms of runtime and resource consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
The blockchain technology, as cutting-edge research, has received extensive attention nowadays. Blockchain is a distributed ledger, which consists of a series of consecutive blocks and is maintained by each node in the network. The verified transactions are stored in these consecutive blocks, and the transaction records are traceable and tamperproof. Due to the traceability, anonymity, irreversibility, and other security traits, the blockchain technology effectively secures transactions and changes the traditional business model [16] . However, some potential security threats still exist in blockchain systems, among which attacks aiming to break the blockchain consensus protocols are the most terrible. Attacks such as selfish mining in Proof-of-Work (PoW) protocol [1] , short/long-range attacks in Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocol [2] , and double-spending [3] in most consensus protocols can rewrite the entire transaction history of blockchain, which will cause considerable loss to many prevailing cryptocurrencies. The designs and implementations of a variety of countermeasures are thus imperative. Nevertheless, many proposed countermeasures either weaken the decentralization trait of blockchain or reduce the performance of blockchain. In this paper, we propose a low-delay and low-consumption protection model based on a smart
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contract that can effectively defend against such attacks. Some algorithms that implement the smart contract are also presented.
Smart contracts are Turing-complete computer programs used to develop contracts within the blockchain platform, e.g., Ethereum [4] . Once an event triggers a clause in the smart contract, the code of the smart contract is automatically executed. The strong point of smart contracts is automatically enforcing agreements among untrusted parties without any third party's intervention. Since it is hard to tamper or control the content and update of smart contracts, the smart contracts are much safer than traditional contracts and inherently applicable to the blockchain ecosystem. There are many fields in which smart contracts can be applied nowadays, e.g., smart grid, digital identity, finance, and supply chain [13] , [14] , but there is no research on adopting smart contracts to mitigate such threats that rewrite the blockchain history. Hence we utilize some security properties of smart contracts to design a smart contract-based secure model for miner registration and block validation. Note that ''miner'' used in this paper denotes the block creator. We aim to adopt this model to make the consensus mechanism in blockchain no longer simply rely on the longest chain rule, effectively detecting and impeding any malicious activities that create a private fork to rewrite the blockchain history. The smart contract in our model has been implemented by the Solidity language v0.5.0, and the full code is presented in Appendix A.
The rest of this paper, which is an extension of the paper presented in [15] , is organized as follows: Section II summarizes the limitations of the prior work. Section III presents the potential threat and the threat model. Section IV introduces the design idea and the main flow of the proposed model. Section V conducts the security analysis. Section VI shows our test results. Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In [9] , Rosenfeld put forward two possible solutions to prevent a double-spend attack rewriting the blockchain history. One is increasing the number of block confirmations, while the other is increasing the value of each transaction. However, both the increased block confirmations and the increased transaction value can reduce the transaction processing speed and the transaction throughputs of blockchain, which does not meet the trend of fast payment of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies.
Li et al. proposed two off-chain mitigations aiming at preventing the long-range attacks in PoS blockchain systems [10] . It is feasible to introduce trust from the offchain, but to some extent, the trust from off-chain belongs to the trust of third parties, which weaken the decentralization trait of blockchain.
Some blockchain-based cryptocurrencies such as Nxt, Ouroboros, PPcoin [5] , [7] , [11] adopt frequent checkpoint mechanism to deter the long-range attacks. After each checkpoint, the blockchain records are finalized and the chain containing these records cannot be forked, making it impossible for malicious nodes to rewrite blockchain records from a timestamp earlier than the latest checkpoint. However, any frequent checkpoint mechanism needs nodes in the blockchain network to be highly synchronized, which causes network congestion and reduces the transaction throughputs. The proposed protection model utilizes the natural trait of blockchain by introducing a smart contract instead of adopting any measures from the third parties. Also, our simulation results can demonstrate that the proposed model does not weaken the performance of blockchain, e.g., consensus efficiency.
III. SECURITY ISSUE STATEMENT A. SECURITY THREAT
Lots of attacks focusing on the blockchain consensus layer aims to rewrite the blockchain history. For instance, double spending attackers create a longer private chain forked from the valid chain and broadcast their malicious fork over the network to erase all the transactions in the valid chain, making the double-spend transactions valid. In PoW-based systems, the attackers need to accumulate massive computational power (e.g., 51% share of computational power) to successfully erase the transaction history in the valid chain. Nevertheless, the attackers can exploit some network vulnerabilities or collude with other malicious miners to form a mining pool to facilitate the success of rewriting the blockchain history [1] . In PoS-based systems, no matter the attackers conduct a short-range or long-range attack, due to the existence of ''nothing at stake'' issue, creating a long private chain does not require lots of computational power, which is feasible for attackers [5] .
B. THREAT MODEL
We assume the rewriting-history attacks occur in the probabilistic finality consensus protocol [6] that adopts the longestchain rule, e.g., PoW, some of PoS such as Ouroboros [7] . In such consensus protocols, a new block needs to wait for several block confirmations to become a confirmed one and each node updates its local blockchain ledger based on the longest chain in the network. We also assume that a set of adversaries A privately forges a private fork and tries to extend it to exceed the main chain. Once the private fork has a longer length than the main chain, the private fork becomes the longest chain, then all the transaction records in the original chain will be erased. The speed at which A creates blocks in the private fork is assumed to be initially slower than the main chain. However, A can exploit some tricks (e.g., launch a concurrent attack) to help them overtake the main chain in a short time [12] .
IV. MODEL DESIGN AND FLOW
In this section, we first introduce the main design idea and structure of the smart contract-based model that can deter the rewriting-history attack. Then, we elaborate on the execution process of this model.
A. DESIGN
Our design goal is to thoroughly impede the threats that rewrite the entire blockchain history, i.e., make the malicious fork created by A invalid. In our threat model, the key to success in rewriting history is to create the longest chain that makes other honest nodes agree on it. Instead, we need to inform the whole network that the chain created by A is invalid. We thus design a secure model that can distinguish whether a block or a chain is valid. Due to the automation and tamper-proof trait of smart contracts, we apply a smart contract to our model. We implement a smart contract that can execute miner registration and block validation. Before a new block is broadcast over the network, one node who has the right to generate this block needs to register with the smart contract, and this contract can use a random algorithm to output a unique voucher V for each node who finishes the registration. Each node stores V issued by the smart contract into the block he will publish. Therefore, V in each block is proof of the validity. Any block that contains an invalid V or does not have V is regarded as an invalid block. The consensus protocol that originally relies on the longest chain is thus changed to rely on a chain containing valid V.
We use the Solidity programming language adopted by Ethereum to design 6 functions for our smart contract, and their descriptions are presented in Table 1 . These 6 functions cover the main flow of the proposed model. Note that Register(), CheckHeight(), CheckBlock() are performed by the contract manager, while the remaining functions are performed by the miner.
B. FLOW AND ALGORITHMS
Before elaborating on the main flow of the proposed model, we do the following assumptions: let M denote the miner who plans to register, let C denote the miner registration and block registration smart contract, and let C m denote the node who deploys and manages the smart contract. We assume C m is elected via voting by other honest nodes. Fig. 1 presents the main structure of the proposed model. C is deployed by C m and stored in the blockchain. The code of C is first compiled into bytecode by a virtual machine, and then the bytecode is stored in a block of the blockchain. In most platforms adopting smart contracts, an interface is provided for the user to easily execute smart contracts. As shown in Fig. 1 , if M and C m want to invoke functions of C, they must first get the interface and the address of C, and then send the transaction that invokes the function to C. After the invoke operation, C will broadcast some state changes (e.g., the update of variables, the output of some functions) over the entire network in the form of transactions, and these transactions will be ultimately stored in the blockchain. Note that we use ''update state'' to represent this process in this paper. Fig. 2 presents the operation process of the proposed model. We explain each process as follows: 3) C m operates the function Register(). In Register(), the first check condition is whether the block height to which the transaction set submitted by M in Step (2) belongs is equal to the next block height of the current blockchain. If not, the execution of Register() interrupts, the registration process thus fails. We create a counter named blockheight to record the increase of the block height. This check condition limits the fact that M can only register with C at the next block height each time, therefore any request for registration at the previous block height or greater than the next block height will be rejected immediately. Once passing the check condition, C will generate V using the transaction set created in Step (2) . C first randomly select one transaction hash from this created transaction set. The random algorithm here is SHA256:
SHA256 takes the current block timestamp (now in the Solidity language) and the first transaction hash in the transaction set as input, then the output is converted to the integer and divided by the length of the transaction set to take the remainder i. The transaction hash at i in the set is fetched, and we also use a SHA256 algorithm to output the random value of it. The input to the algorithm that generates this random value is the selected transaction hash, the current block timestamp, and i+1.
We regard this random value as V:
The purpose of using the SHA256 algorithm twice is to reduce the predictability of V and prevent some VOLUME 7, 2019 malicious miners from calculating V in advance. A two-dimensional mapping hash table named logger is used to store V at each block height. The structure of logger is shown in Fig. 3 . The function Register() then returns V to C m . The algorithm of Register() is shown in Alg. 1. Moreover, due to the transparency trait of smart contracts, the transaction data and the status update for each call to the contract will be saved in the blockchain. If there is no encryption, V can be viewed by any node, which will lead to one malicious miner to store V which does not belong to him into his block and publish it in advance of the block that should contain this V. Our goal is to ensure that V is only visible to C m and M who registers in that round before a new block is released. Our solution is to adopt a hardware enclave like a trusted execution environment (TEE) to protect the confidentiality of the return value and the status update of C [8] . We assume that such hardware enclave (e.g., TEE) has been installed on C m 's computer. As shown in Fig. 4 , not all the functions in C is protected. Instead, only when C m invokes the function Register(), the bytecode of this function is loaded into the trusted enclave to run, thus the returned V is encrypted, and we assume only C m has a key to decrypt it. The specific implementation of the trusted enclave is omitted here. not published his newly mined block, C will delete the record of V at that block height in logger. Instead, if M passes this check, the registration status of M turns to be ''registered''. 7) Any M whose registration status is ''registered'' can withdraw the deposit invested before by invoking the function Withdraw(). Instead, those whose registration status is ''unregistered'' cannot withdraw their previous deposit. 8) Each time a new block occurs in the blockchain network, C m will first get some necessary information of this block, e.g., the stored V, the previous block hash, the current block hash, and the block height. 9) C m submits the information obtained in Step (8) to invoke the function CheckBlock() for the block validation. C keeps another two mapping hash tables, one of which records V that has been verified, and another records the block hashes of the verified blocks. The criteria for determining whether a block is valid are as follows: the stored C can be found in logger, the stored V has not been verified before, and the previous block hash is valid. According to these criteria, C announces the validation result ''True'' or ''False'' over the network, and any node can make a consensus based on this result. The new valid block will only be added after the block whose validation result is ''True'', thus the 13: if #height == blkheight then 14: blkheight ← blkheight − 1 15: end if 16: return False 17: end if fork containing one block whose validation result is ''False'' will not get the consensus in the network. The algorithm of the block validation is presented in Alg. 2.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze several possible threat behaviors of A and whether these potential threats can be successfully prevented by the proposed protection model.
According to the threat model presented in Section III, A intends to forge a private fork with a long length. We assume the current situation is that the private fork still falls behind the main chain and the gap is only one block. Fig. 5 presents the current attack scenario. We can easily discover from Fig. 5 that the blocks represented in grey are generated by A, and the blocks represented in white are generated by the honest miners. We assume that the current block height in the blockchain is H , thus the latest block in the main chain is at height H , while the latest block in the private fork is at height H − 1. Under this circumstance, A has four different options:
Case 1: A truthfully inputs the necessary information (e.g., block height, a set of transaction hashes) to invoke the function CreateTranset() to create a transaction set. However, the current block height in the private fork is H − 1, hence the block height submitted by A is less than H . This case does not satisfy the check condition in Register() (i.e., A must submit the height H + 1 to C). The subsequent registration procedure will not be executed, and C will return an error, therefore A cannot get V issued by C.
Case 2:
A learned that such a bad result would occur if they acted truthfully, so they decide to submit bogus block heights to defraud C. Instead of submitting H − 1, A submits a bogus block height H + 1, which does not breach the check condition in Register(). Unfortunately, after A successfully gets V issued by C, C m will do another check by operating the function CheckHeight(). C will discover that the current block height has not increased by 1 since A is stealthily creating blocks instead of publishing them. Then C will delete the record of V originally belonging to A in logger.
Case 3: A can choose to evade registering with C. Since A does not participate in the registration, A cannot get any V issued by C, which is the same as the result of Case 1.
Case 4: It is the subsequent behaviors of A in Case 1 and Case 3. When A does not get any V issued by C, A will store a set of V from the valid blocks into the blocks of the corresponding block heights in the private fork. However, these valid V have been verified, which does not satisfy the check condition in the function CheckBlock() (i.e., Step (9)).
Based on the above four cases, the blocks before H + 1 in the private fork cannot get through the block validation CheckBlock() and get validation results ''False''. If A successfully creates one block at H + 1 in advance of the main chain, even if A can obtain a valid V after a normal registration, according to Step (9), C will check whether the previous block is valid. Therefore, the block at H +1 is proved invalid, resulting in the private fork released by A not being supported by the honest nodes since it is regarded as an invalid chain. To sum up, the behavior of rewriting the history of the blockchain fails under the proposed smart contract-based model.
VI. SIMULATION
In this section, we test the smart contract in the proposed model on the Ethereum test network by using Truffle v5.0.11 and Ganache v1.1.0. Truffle is a testing framework for Ethereum, and Ganache is a private Ethereum client program [17], [18] . Our experiment platform is a Macbook laptop with 2GHz Intel Core i5 and 8GB DRAM. We record the average execution time of this smart contract from the miner registration phase to the block check phase and the gas consumption of each function. The simulation results are presented in Table 2 and 3. In Ethereum, in addition to block rewards, miners earn money by receiving transaction ''fuel''. The unit of transaction ''fuel'' is gas, which represents the cost of running smart contracts. In general, the size of gas is related to the complexity of the code in the contracts [4] , [19] . Hence, we calculate the cost of performing our smart contract by checking the gas consumption of each function. Table 2 presents both gas cost and US dollar cost of our smart contract. Note that the current gas price in Ethereum is 2 × 10 −9 ether, and now the exchange rate is 1 ether = 153.31USD 1 . As can be seen from Table 2 , the cost of running the proposed smart contract in the test is quite low. The highest cost consumed in the proposed smart contract is the function CreateTranset() since miners need to submit several transaction hashes, which bring large storage complexity to this function. However, the cost of CreateTranset() is just 0.0715 USD, which will not bring great financial pressure to miners.
When testing the execution time of the smart contract, we set up five cases that miners submit five different number of transaction hashes: 2, 10, 15, 20, 30. In each case, we tested 10 times and took the average execution time of 10 tests as a result. From Table 3 , we can find that the average execution time does not fluctuate significantly as the number of hashes increases. Therefore, we can infer the number of submitted transaction hashes does not affect the execution time of our proposed smart contract, and the average execution time is less than 400ms, which indicates that the proposed model does not cause a big network latency to influence the consensus procedure of the blockchain system.
In conclusion, we can demonstrate that the proposed smart contract-based model is feasible since the time consumption and the overhead of our model are negligible, which does not have a significant impact on the blockchain network and users.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a smart contract-based secure model against rewriting-history attacks. The proposed model requires miners to register with a smart contract before publishing blocks. Each miner who has passed the registration will get a valid voucher. Then, the smart contract verifies the validity of blocks that occur in the network by checking the stored vouchers. Our proposed model changes the traditional mechanism of relying on the longest chain to reach consensus. Through analyzing four possible behaviors of the attackers, we demonstrated that our model can make any attack that rewrites the transaction history of the blockchain invalid. Besides, we simulated the proposed smart contract on the Ethereum test network and obtained a good result that the proposed model is economical without weakening the blockchain performance. We also presented the Solidity code that implements our smart contract in Appendix VII. However, smart contracts also have some security vulnerabilities, we need to improve our code to avoid security problems. Moreover, for the two random algorithms to output vouchers in the proposed model, they should be better designed and implemented in the future. 
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